Redistributive economies collect and distribute goods through centralized decision making (Polanyi 1957a ). Of course, some redistribution occurs in any society, whatever the economy. Past societies with redistributive mechanisms include the primitive hunting tribe, ancient Egypt, Babylonia, and Peru, and the later Roman Empire. In modem market economies, redistribution takes place through the institutions of the welfare state, but in state socialist societies redistribution constitutes the integrative principle of the economy. These mechanisms in state socialism fundamentally involve a vertical relationship between redistributor and producer, in which a multilevel bureaucratic hierarchy allocates resources and redistributes income (Kornai 1989) . In these societies, redistribution occurs within subsocietal units such as agricultural collectives, where collective cadres provide central direction in allocating land, labor, and farm implements, distributing income to households. While at the societal level, redistribution integrates the economy through the institutions of central planning, in a market economy, coordination occurs through a horizontal relationship between legally equal buyers and sellers at prices based upon mutual agreement.
The role of markets in China has steadily increased since 1978 and the agricultural sector has undergone the most dramatic shift in reliance on market coordination. In 1980, the state instituted the "household responsibility system" which is in many ways similar to private farming in a market economy, with the household leasing its land and paying the delivery quota as rent. "Under this system the American Sociological Review, 1989, Vol. 54 (October:663481) 664 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW farm household has control over the land it uses and can choose what to produce and how to market its products as is the case in a market economy" (Chow 1987, p. 296 ). This change in ownership structure returned to peasants incentives in line with their traditional preferences for household production and eliminated the "free rider" dilemma that had plagued collectivist agriculture (Nee 1985 Table 1 ).' In 1978, 66 percent of household income was derived from the redistributive sector (agricultural collective) and only 27 percent from household production. By 1985, 81 percent of household income came from household commodity production, and only 8 percent from the redistributive/collective sector. The value of market transactions approached half of the total purchase value by 1985 at 70,500 million yuan from 23,500 million yuan in 1980 (Watson 1988 ). Thus within a span of seven years, China's rural economy experienced a rapid transition from a redistributive/ collective economy to a marketlike economy. Indeed, the agricultural sector has become a vast "second" economy, far larger in scope than the second economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The second economy includes all income-generating activity outside the boundaries of the redistributively coordinated and managed economy including private construction, manufacturing, commerce, handicrafts, repairs, services, and moonlighting for private gain (Stark, forthcoming; Gabor 1979 ). Due to the rural character of the Chinese second economy, its most common units are the peasant household farm and firm. Though the household enterprises of peasant entrepreneurs are typically very small, in principle they can expand into larger enterprises that hire labor from outside the immediate kin group. Chinese private sector firms have access to official sources of credit and thus have the potential for expansion. Already the rapid growth of household and joint-stock firms in villages and small towns reflects the enormous growth potential of the Chinese second economy.
Recently sociologists have pointed to the unexpected expansion of the informal sector in capitalist economies (Portes and SassenKoob 1987); even more surprising has been the rapid growth of the marketlike second economy in state socialist economies. Producers in the second economy of socialist economies conduct their business in a zone relatively autonomous from the state. Like the informal sector or "underground" economy in capitalist societies, the socialist second economy operates in the shadows of the modern and state-regulated economy. The Chinese second economy, however, is both legal and subject to state regulation, though in practice it is largely unregulated and untaxed. Producers in the second economy of socialist economies conduct their business in a zone relatively autonomous from the state. As Stark aptly puts it, "The boundaries of the second economy and the relative proportions of its legal, illegal, and alegal parts are products of contestation between state and society-a continuously changing outcome of a struggle in which society attempts to create and maintain a sphere of activity relatively autonomous from the state" (Stark, forthcoming). A defining feature of the second economy in state socialism is the lack of fully legitimated and well-defined private property rights (which is why the second economy remains a marketlike institution). Just as the welfare state did not lead to socialist ' Redistribution takes place both within the collective (through the allocative decisions made by cadres) and through the institution of central planning (state procurement of agricultural products at lower than market prices and the monopolistic sale of manufactured products to peasants at prices substantially higher than world prices). Both aspects of redistribution are still operative after decollectivization (Lardy 1989 ), but influence a substantially smaller portion of the total household income. (Polanyi 1957b ) in a-substantive analysis of the redistributive mechanism in state socialism, Szelenyi's theory specifies the underlying processes through which surplus is appropriated in state socialist economies. A feature of state socialism, argues Szelenyi, is that the price of labor is set administratively by the state. Just as labor markets are the central institution of capitalist economies, so the core institution of state socialist economies is the nonmarket trade of labor. When salaries and wages are set administratively and not through transactive market relationships, surplus is directly centralized in the state budget and redistributed according to centrally defined goals and values. Hence the state socialist redistributive mechanism appropriates surplus directly from the immediate producer and creates and structures social inequalities through the processes of its reallocation.
Szelenyi innovatively argues that the redistributive mechanism in state socialism differs fundamentally from that of the capitalist welfare state. In the welfare state, redistribution reduces the inequalities produced in the marketplace (Wilensky 1975) . Though the welfare state has a decidedly procapital bias, the pattern of state expenditures has resulted in modest gains for labor (Devine 1983 ) and in the reduction of poverty, though without changing the underlying pattern of wealth concentration (Danziger and Weinberg 1986; Gough 1979). Scholars commonly assume that redistribution in the socialist state would be more progressive than in the welfare state (Stephens 1986 ). Contrary to expectations, the redistributive mechanism in state socialist economies does not give rise to more equality, but to greater social inequality (Konrad and Szelenyi 1979; Szelenyi 1983 ). In state socialism, argues Szelenyi, the expansion of the dominant redistributive sector of the economy adds to the advantages of the already privileged and powerful. The effect of redistribution is more evident in higher nonwage compensations for the "redistributive class," such as housing, access to higher education, subsidies for certain commodities, the health and pension plans, and is only partially reflected in salaried income (Szelenyi 1983 ). Redistributors are "selfish" in that they "favor 'their own kind' (or more sociologically speaking: the class which is organized around the monopoly of redistributive power) when they allocate scarce resources" (Szelenyi 1978 , p. 77).
THEORY OF MARKET TRANSITION
On the basis of his substantive analysis of social inequalities in state socialism, Szelenyi speculated that "the interests of the powerless and disprivileged can be best served with increasingly transactive (and consequently market-like) relationships in the economic system" (Szelenyi 1978, p. 63). The dramatic increases in peasant household income following market reform in China and the consequent narrowing of the rural-urban income gap are consistent with Szelenyi's inference. Under the redistributive economy, urban bureaucrats, professionals, staff, and salaried working class benefited from the low purchasing price of grain and other staples. Following market reform, prices for most agricultural products have risen sharply. This has dramatically increased the income of rural producers and has inflated the cost of food commodities to urban dwellers. Thus, whereas rural-urban inequality widened under the redistributive economy, it narrowed substantially after market reform (Ignatius 1988) . Such descriptive analysis, however, fails to distinguish between redistributors and producers in both the rural and urban sectors of the economy, though it does demonstrate that the transition from redistributive allocation to marketlike transactive exchange benefits direct producers, in this case peasant households, which make up about 80 percent of the population.
Though Szelenyi identifies the underlying processes of the redistributive mechanism in state socialism, he does not explain why the shift from redistributive to market coordination would benefit immediate producers; nor do Manchin and Szelenyi (1987) identify the processes underlying the expected transfer of power and privilege. By extending the logic of Polanyi's and Szelenyi's analyses of the redistributive economy to a reforming socialist economy, I propose the theory of market transition in the following interrelated theses:
(1) The market power thesis: If surplus is no longer monopolized by the redistributive sector, and more is allocated and distributed through marketlike exchanges, two things are likely to happen. First, less power-control over resources-is located in the redistributive economy and more in marketlike transactive exchanges. Second, when the price of labor and goods is based upon mutual agreement between buyer and seller, and not set by administrative fiat, direct producers have more power over the terms of exchange for their goods and services. Therefore, the transition from redistribution to markets involves a transfer of power favoring direct producers relative to redistributors.
(2) The market incentive thesis: Markets provide powerful incentives for immediate producers whereas redistributive economies depress incentives. In the state socialist redistributive economy, administratively set prices for labor (in industry and services) tend to lack sensitivity to differential performance and (for agricultural products) are set lower than market-determined prices. In market transactions, however, producers have the right to withhold their product or labor power until a mutually agreed upon price is set; as a result, a greater share of the surplus is retained by direct producers.2 There are also greater incentives for individual effort because rewards are more closely related to individual productivity. This is likely to be reflected in higher returns of education, which is among the best indicators of human productivity (Mincer 1958; Schultz 1963 Together the three theses constitute a theory of market transition in state socialist societies. They specify the central processes in the shift from hierarchies to markets that involve fundamental changes in the sources of power, and in the structures of incentives and of opportunities. Changes in distribution will flow from changes in power, incentives, and opportunities. The processes are interdependent and occur simultaneously. Overall, the theory of market transition predicts that direct producers gain in power relative to redistributors in the sectors of the socialist economy that experience a shift from redistributive to market allocation.
The market transition theory turns on the decisiveness of the shift to reliance on the market mechanism in the allocation and distribution of goods. A corollary of the theory is that less market coordination and greater reliance on bureaucratic coordination will result in greater power of the class organized around redistribution. Therefore, in sectors and regions of the socialist economy where allocation and distribution continue to be based upon central decision, there will be little or no change in the processes determining stratification. For this reason we expect more continuity in the distribution of power and privilege in less commercialized hinterland regions, collective enterprises managed by township, county, and municipal administrations, and especially the socialized state sector. Another corollary of the market transition theory is that following a shift to market allocation sectors and regions that were "contributors" in societal redistributive processes prior to market reform will experience net gains over those that were beneficiaries of redistribution. For example, prior to market reform, redistribution diverted surplus from coastal industrial cities like Shanghai to support development in hinterland provinces. Economic reforms now allow factories to retain a substantially greater portion of profits. Thus, in the balance of exchanges between rural and urban sectors and coastal and inland provinces, the rural sector and coastal provinces in China have realized greater benefits from economic reform. Kornai (1986) contends that the dilemma of partial reform in the state sector results from "dual dependence" on bureaucratic and market mechanisms of economic coordination. Attempts to impose the discipline of markets on firms in the state sector have failed because market forces are constrained and dominated by continued bureaucratic micro-interventions (Kornai 1984) . As a result, the urban economy has remained redistributive despite efforts to introduce more market coordination in the state sector (Lin 1989) .
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
By contrast, the rural sector, as already shown, has experienced a decisive shift from redistributive to market coordination. Moreover, the structure of opportunities has changed rapidly as the rural economy has diversified from a predominant reliance on agriculture to a wide range of other sources of income (Watson 1988 ). This change is evident in the growing proportion of the peasant household income derived from nonagricultural sources (Table 2) : that figure tripled between 1978 and 1985.
Because market reform in urban areas is still at an early stage, I focus on the rural economy to test the market transition theory.3 Though some agricultural collectives in some regions of China persist as potent organizations that manage and allocate economic resources, the broader national trend away from redistributive to market coordination in the Chinese countryside is clearly documented in Table 1 .
At the village level decollectivization sharply curtailed the redistributive power of "grass-roots" cadres (village officials). Nev-668 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW ertheless, cadres still control the allocation of remaining collective assets (i.e., collective enterprises, orchards, ponds, and other productive properties owned by the collective), negotiate household quota production for the state, and collect taxes and other fees (Oi, forthcoming). In the transition from redistributive to market allocation, economic transactions are often embedded in social networks in which officials hold pivotal positions, certainly more so than in a market economy . Local cadres frequently act as brokers or middlemen in exchanges involving economic transactions between peasant entrepreneurs and state agencies. Entrepreneurs must mobilize social networks to gain access to capital, labor, raw materials, technology, and markets, sometimes seeking access through bribes or gifts to local cadres.4 To the extent that hierarchical forms of economic coordination remain dominant, personal connections between state agencies, firms, and households continue to provide critical informal linkages. But where market reform has resulted in bypassing hierarchies, the extent of vertical segmentation characteristic of socialist economies is reduced as horizontal market relationships establish new social networks between private buyers and sellers. The market transition theory maintains that the more complete the shift to market coordination, the less likely that economic transactions will be embedded in networks dominated by cadres, and the more likely power -control over resourceswill be located in market institutions and in social networks (guanxi) of private buyers and sellers. My study seeks to document this shift in the sources of power.
DATA AND MEASURES
I derive 10 hypotheses from the three market transition theses in order to provide multiple tests (Stinchcombe 1968 (Bourdieu 1977) .
Interviewers asked household heads whether a member of the household had ever served as a team, brigade, commune, or county cadre or was presently a cadre (village as well as higher levels). Household heads were asked whether they started up a household enterprise in recent years and how much they invested in the business. In order to control for the size of investment, and therefore the relative scale of the enterprises, I used the amount invested in starting up a private business as the variable for entrepreneur. The mean start-up capital for entrepreneurs was 1,603 yuan.
Institutional or contextual variables were drawn from village-level data. Urban proximity is measured by kilometers from the nearest city. Market access is a factor score that combined three locational measures of market access: distances to the nearest city, county town, and standard marketing town. Per capita farmland is based upon the arable land assigned to a household divided by the household size. The measure of the village's educational level is a factor score that combined the percentage of school-age children who graduated from primary and junior middle school in 1974 and 1984. Factor scores are based on confirmatory factor analysis. Lastly, the density of households with overseas relatives is based upon estimates by village cadres.
First, I examine the independent effects of occupational status on household income for current cadres, former team and brigade cadres, and entrepreneurs. Second, I compare the returns on human capital investments for the pooled husband's and wife's education on household income before and after market reform. Third, I estimate the effects on household income of the human capital variables, age of household head, the number of adult laborers and children in the household, and media use (or cultural capital). Fourth, I examine the independent effect of urban proximity on household income before and after structural reforms. Lastly, I estimate the changing effects on household income of the institutional context: urban proximity, market access, village educational attainment, per capital farmland, and density of village overseas connections.
A lagged income variable is used to absorb the determinants of household income not specified by the models. Table 3 ). Notwithstanding the net benefits of children's labor contribution to the household economy there is an inverse relationship between the number of dependents supported by a household and its per capita income. Thus, though children contribute at an early age to the household economy, they do so at a level lower than experienced adult laborers. I expect that changes in the underlying processes of socioeconomic attainment will reduce the value of political capital in a more generic sense. Not only are the direct controllers of the redistributive mechanism likely to experience a relative loss, but the value of their political capital accumulated through prior experience as cadre is likely to diminish as well. At the most general level, this hypothesis predicts a decline in the value of political connections. I can indirectly test this hypothesis by examining the returns on former cadre status. Former cadres have typically accumulated political capital through prior service and are likely to have strong guanxi ties (personal connections) with current cadres, since as former cadres they are likely to be members of the same status group.
The decline in the value of political capital must be viewed relative to other groups. Thus household income of cadres should have increased in recent years along the general trend. But relative to others, and especially entrepreneurs, cadres are not expected to gain special advantages, net of human capital and household characteristics, for their cadre status after the shift to a marketlike economy. Social groups closely linked to the market rather than the redistributive mechanism will experience higher gain in household income. If the hypothesis is supported, entrepreneurs should have significantly higher returns than cadres. Hypothesis 2: The more market exchange replaces the redistributive mechanism in state socialism, the less the value of political capital relative to market capital.
A widely held view among China scholars is that local cadres have been surprisingly adept in their response to market reform by becoming entrepreneurial themselves (Zweig 1986; Oi 1986 ). According to this view, local cadres have used their political capital to establish a dominant role in the commercialization of agriculture to such an extent that entrepreneurs come mainly from cadre backgrounds. This interpretation fails to take into account the changes in the underlying processes that determine socioeconomic attainment accompanying a shift from redistributive to market coordination. In a market economy, specialists in redistribution are not necessarily more likely than other households to have the experience and orientation required for private sector entrepreneurship. Hypothesis 3: In sectors of the socialist economy that experience a shift from bureaucratic to market coordination, redistributors have little or no net advantage in entering into private entrepreneurship.
Results
The results reported in Table 3 level cadre in collectivized agriculture and were routinely engaged in agricultural work themselves. Thus they are advantaged, not as cadres but as direct producers in a marketlike economy. Overall, these findings provide strong evidence that the sources of power have shifted decidedly from the redistributive economy to the marketplace.
The cross-tabulation of cadre with entrepreneurs shows that current and former brigade cadres have a somewhat higher probability of being entrepreneurs than noncadre households, which is consistent with the view that cadres have been adept in their accommodation to a marketlike economy. This notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of entrepreneurs come from direct producers, as predicted by the theory of market transition. Moreover, despite the descriptive evidence of a higher probability, the Goodman and Kruscal's Tau test indicates that knowledge of cadre background reduces the error in predicting entrepreneur status by one-half of one percent. 12 A growing consensus among political scientists concurs with the findings reported in this analysis: that there has been a "redistribution of power to the peasantry" (White 1987 instrumental use of political capital-guanxi ties and official position-for private gain. These seemingly contradictory findings, however, need not be interpreted as such. I assume that rural cadres have been vigorous in pursuing their material interests with all the means available to them, and that guile and opportunism have been common among rural cadres. After all, if the state exhorts peasants to enrich themselves, why should peasant cadres be excluded from the pursuit of private gain? Current cadres and former cadres have become entrepreneurs (see Table 4 While a cadre may benefit materially from taking an occasional bribe or accepting gifts, in a market economy the greatest increases of wealth come from successful entrepreneurship, and not from petty bribes and gifts.'4 That many cadres accept gifts or bribes in exchange for official favor in itself reflects the shift in the sources of power which our findings document. It is also important to keep in mind that our analysis specifies the effect of structural transformation on change in income, not the level of household income. In our sample, cadres have a higher mean household income before and after market reform, but the increase in household income is no higher than that of other households, and substantially lower than that of peasant entrepreneurs. 15 
THE MARKET INCENTIVE THESIS Derived Hypotheses
During the period of collectivized farming, schooling in rural China did not appear to serve as an avenue for family prosperity or individual social mobility. Though schooling was seen as providing useful knowledge, parents believed that schooling was not indispensable as preparation for farm work (Parish and Whyte 1978) . Moreover, there were no clear benefits associated with more schooling. Schooling did not appear to provide ambitious young peasants an avenue for upward social mobility, such as assignments to state sector jobs or cadre positions in the village and local government. Middle school graduates typically had no alternative but to return to the village after graduation, where they discovered that they were often at a disadvantage to village youth who had entered farming earlier and had already become experienced farmers (Nee 1983 ). More schooling did not result in higher 14 The assessment of cadre gains after market reform reported by field researchers very often are based upon observations made in the redistributive sectors where cadres continue to benefit form the "gift economy." 
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW workpoint assignments from the team since workpoints were assigned almost exclusively on quantity of labor inputs. Nor did more schooling entitle a village youth to a cadre position, which depended more on the accumulation of political capital from villagebased activism than on educational credentials (Madsen 1984) . 16 The transition to a marketlike economy should result in higher returns to human capital characteristics. First, markets provide powerful incentives for direct producers through both positive and negative sanctions. In household production the economic wellbeing of households depends entirely on the performance of its productive members in a more complex and demanding economic environment. Rather than simply accumulating workpoints based upon labor inputs in agricultural production, the household in a marketlike economy pursues a strategy of maximizing profits from existing income streams and developing new, more profitable lines of activity. Rather than earning workpoints on a steady, predictable basis, peasants in a marketlike economy are transformed into petty entrepreneurs whose relative success is based upon the ability to make short-and long-term investment decisions based upon informed cost-benefit calculations. Educated peasants who are better able to draw on and use available information have a clear advantage over illiterate peasants (Schultz 1964) . Second, in a marketlike economy, profit making is associated with the production of cash crops, lucrative sidelines, and nonagricultural enterprise. The ability to learn and acquire the techniques required for the introduction of more profitable undertakings typically depends on having some degree of formal education, at last enough to read and digest simple technical literature. In the post-Mao era of sweeping institutional reforms, the educated peasant has an advantage in being more able to discern subtle policy transitions and political trends transmitted in the news media and to understand the implications of these changes for the local political economy.
In collectivized agriculture entire villages got along with a few subscriptions to the party newspaper and radio broadcasts. Today there is a surprisingly wide range of technical and market-oriented newspapers and magazines available to households, as well as a wider selection of radio and television programs. In part this reflects the liberalization of the cultural sphere in post-Mao China. It also reflects the greater demand for information among rural families. Rather than local cadres being the principal readers of printed news, after market reform peasant households consume an increasingly diverse range of media and printed information. The household's use of media (cultural capital) is expected to have a significant net effect on the household's earning power in a marketlike economy. This is consistent with the revised attainment model proposed by DiMaggio and Mohr (1985) in which they incorporated cultural capital as an independent determinant of socioeconomic outcome.
Hypothesis 4: For both men and women the transition from state socialist redistribution to markets increases the value of education to the household. Hypothesis 5: Media use (or cultural capital) has a positive effect on household income in a marketlike economy:
Results
In Table 5 , I do not attempt to estimate a complete model of the processes of household earning power (which is reported in subsequent tables). Rather I assess the change in returns on human capital measured by schooling following market reform. The purpose is to determine the effects and significance of market reform on household returns to human capital investments rather than the parameters of the model as a whole. Lagged income variables for 1975 and 1980 capture the unspecified determinants of household income. Though the effects of the combined husband and wife's education (EDUCA-TION) were not significant, its sign is negative. Equation V reveals a dramatic 16 Despite negligible returns on education in collectivized agriculture, school attendance increased during the Maoist era from prerevolutionary China. The expansion of mass education in state socialism can be explained by the change in political power and associated ideology in a successful social revolution (Easterlin 1981) . During the Maoist era, sustained ideological and mobilizational efforts were directed at increasing the educational attainment of peasant children. These have declined following decollectivization. 
THE MARKET OPPORTUNITY THESIS

Derived Hypotheses
The following hypotheses examine institutional or contextual effects on household earning power. These hypotheses suggest that the transition from state socialist redistribution to markets results in changing the manner in which structural variables affect earning power at the community level. If the market opportunity thesis is correct, I expect that market reform will strengthen the effects of market structures on household income.
During the Maoist era of collectivist agriculture, rural-urban trade was curtailed under the state procurement plan in which agricultural surplus was sold directly to the state. Rigid constraints barring free trade between peasant producers and urban markets were enforced (Lardy 1983 ). All forms of long distance trade involving peasant producers came to a virtual standstill (Lyons 1987) . Villages became increasingly self-sufficient, resulting in the constriction of marketing activity within the local marketing system. Following market reform, however, ruralurban trade in China expanded rapidly, as peasant households once again were permitted to market their products directly in urban 17 When the husband's and wife's educational attainments are disaggregated, the effect of wife's educational attainment is significant (p < .001), whereas the husband's remains nonsignificant. But in the complete model used in Table 6 , both husband's (p < .05) and wife's (p < .001) educational attainments are significant when disaggregated. Adult female illiteracy is still very high, at 68 percent. Peasant women play a central role in household commodity production, whereas grain production to satisfy subsistence needs and meet the state grain quota continues to be largely a male-dominated activity.
18 A paradoxical outcome of market reform was the sharp decline in school enrollment of peasant children. Whereas in the Maoist era, when there was no apparent significant return to education, school enrollment steadily increased, after market reform, peasants withdrew their children from school in record numbers. Although my regression analysis indicates significant returns to education after market reform, it may take awhile for people to recognize the changes in returns on education. Education is a long-term investment, the benefits of which may not accrue directly to the parents, especially in the case of daughters who marry out of the household and are not expected to support the parents in old age. Thus short-term calculations of costs and benefits have led peasants to withdraw children from school to meet a perceived labor shortage in the household economy after market reform. I anticipate, however, that school enrollment and educational attainment for peasant children will eventually increase beyond the level achieved in the Maoist era. In collectivized agriculture the emphasis on self-sufficiency and the constraints on market transactions led to a greater reliance on grain production as the primary source of income. The Maoist policy of self-sufficiency, state procurement, and restriction of rural marketing brought about a sharp reduction of sideline commodity production as a source of income for peasants, though it continued to constitute about 25 percent of household income (Fei 1979) . Following market reform, sideline commodity production has increased sharply. In the Fujian sample, income from sideline production in 1984 made up 55.2 percent of total household income. Thus after reform a larger proportion of household income derives from factors of production other than the arable land assigned to the household. Hypothesis 9: The per capita land holding is likely to have a decreasing effect on household income in a diversified commodity economy. Fei (1953) pointed to the "social erosion" of Chinese villages as a result of outmigration to urban centers in the prerevolutionary period. Out-migration of young men and the consequent dependence on remittances sent back from abroad may cause underdevelopment of the village economy. Not only is there an outflow of the most talented and energetic men, but also the long-term effect of dependence on remittances may be a welfare mentality. Thus "social erosion" is likely to become more pronounced in a market economy where restrictions on labor migration are relaxed and out-migration of young laborers resumes, especially in villages with a tradition of high levels of labor migration. Hypothesis 10: In reforming socialist economies, a history of high out-migration has a negative effect on individual household income in a village.
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Results
The data in Tables 7 and 8 support the institutional effect hypotheses. Table 7 provides clear evidence that in the period prior to decollectivization (equation VIII), urban proximity did not matter to households in terms of growth in their earning power.'9 Urban proximity, among the strongest determinants of rural income throughout the world (Schultz 1953) , may have dropped out as a predictor of household income in collectivist agriculture. After structural reform (equation IX), urban proximity gained very considerably in its effect on the rate of growth of household income within a community. For every kilometer further from an urban center, peasant households in a village lose about 11 yuan in growth in household income after structural reform. The results in Table 7 provide strong evidence to support the view (Hypothesis 8) that decollectivization and market reform have resulted in the renewal of the traditional relationship between urban proximity and the level of household participation in rural-urban trade. Peasant households in communities located closer to cities are better able to market their products in the more lucrative and differentiated urban markets. Data in Table 8 show that the independent effect of market access increases as markets become more important in economic coordination. Growth of household earnings is significantly lower in villages that have a history of overseas emigration. Especially striking is the changing effect of village investment in education, from a very significant negative to an equally significant (p < .001) positive effect on growth in household earnings. This finding is consistent with the results reported on the effect of household educational attainment on income before and after market reform. Lastly, the change in the size of the coefficient and the higher t-ratio (t = -1.27) weakly support the hypothesis of a decreasing effect of land holding after market reform. ' 9 Skinner (1978) shows that suburban communes located within metropolitan boundaries benefited from urban proximity prior to economic reforms and achieved economic parity. In his view the urban/rural divide should be redrawn as "urban cum peri-urban islands" in a sea that is more strictly rural. 
CONCLUSION
I began with Polanyi's concept of redistribution and nonmarket trade, pointing to the way in which Szelenyi applied these concepts in a substantive analysis of social inequality in state socialism. In state socialist redistributive economies, surplus is appropriated from producers through the nonmarket trade of labor and commodities and redistributed by administrative processes. Under the redistributive mechanism, the allocation and distribution of surplus benefit Szelenyi's new class since redistributors tend to favor their own. By building on and extending the conceptual framework developed by Polanyi and Szelenyi, I proposed a theory of market transition. Three theses explain the effect of the transition to transactive markets on the distribution of rewards in state socialism. The market power thesis argues that as markets replace redistributive mechanisms in the allocation and distribution of goods, there is a shift in the sources of power from the redistributive sector to the marketplace. The market incentive thesis argues that markets provide more incentives than do redistributive economies. The market opportunity thesis states that the shift to market coordination gives rise to new opportunity structures centered on the marketplace, changing the manner in which structural constraints affect socioeconomic outcome. A fundamental change in the processes of socioeconomic attainment occurs in the transition from redistribution to markets, involving not only a reduction in the relative transfers of surplus from producers to redistributors but changes in opportunity structures and incentives resulting from market reforms.
The fate of market reform depends not only on economic efficiency, but ultimately also on struggle over the distribution of power and privilege. Efficiency and power are intertwined in the sense that if market reform results in more rapid economic growth, this is likely to make the struggle over rewards less contentious. High inflation in food prices already has led to widespread urban discontent and resentment. The high rate of economic growth, however, has allowed the state to respond by increasing urban income and bonuses to salaried employees. In an expanding economy, despite the transfers of power this paper documents, the greater affluence produced by markets reinforces the sense that the benefits of economic reform are widely distributed. Though some have gained more than others from market reform, even urban dwellers have experienced net improvements in standard of living. If, however, economic growth falters and declines, there will be intense urban pressure to constrain markets and to reimpose redistributive power over peasants while curtailing entrepreneurship in the second economy. Who gains and loses in the shift to market coordination structures the bureaucratic politics of reform (cf. Shirk 1989). The politics of reform cycles is shaped by the interest of redistributors to limit reform to partial measures and by the need to deepen reform to achieve efficiency and growth (cf. Stark and Nee 1989, pp.
25-29).
If in the future there is a decisive shift to market coordination in the collective and state-owned industrial sectors, the market transition theory advanced in this paper can be tested on urban data as well. I suspect, however, that this is not likely to occur in the absence of corresponding political reforms of the Leninist party state. As Brus points out,
